Western Sahara
Sahrawi diplomat: "Kofi Annan disappoints"

afrol News, 15 June - The Western Sahara delegation negotiating the future of the Sahrawi territory with Morocco under UN auspices has found a clear opponent in mediator James Baker, who, as expected, is tilting towards a Moroccan solution. The change of heart of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was however more "difficult to understand," a top Sahrawi diplomat told afrol News.

Interviewing Emhamed Khadad, Polisario's Coordinator to the UN Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara (Minurso), afrol News asked about the climate between the top Sahrawi diplomat and James Baker, after the latter had proposed to make Western Sahara an autonomous Moroccan province (under the so-called "Framework Agreement"), based on a proposal of Moroccan origin. Baker has been known to lobby hard for his "Framework Agreement". 

- I can tell you that Mr Baker has devoted much of his time to this matter, Khadad answers immediately, underlining the mutual respect existing. 

- His main quality is that he is very direct, Khadad adds, "and my conclusion after five years is that he is a person who really wants to dedicate himself to this work and find a solution to the conflict. I can't say what kind of solution, but I'll say he would very much like to find a definitive solution to this matter." 

- Does it have to be his solution, or could it be whichever solution? we ask Khadad. 

- Well, in a certain way, his solution, Khadad holds. "But he cannot ignore the opinion of the parties to the conflict in a regional framework and the position of the members of the UN Security Council," he adds. He, the Polisario Front, Algeria and the majority of the UN members disagreed to Baker's solution. 

But Baker was open to other solutions, Khadad holds. "I am very happy about the fact that Mr Baker has not blackmailed the members of the Security Council and has not said that, in the case the Framework Agreement was not adopted, he would resign. I am very happy he has denied this rumour and has said that the important thing to him was that the Security Council adopted a clear position."

Baker is the Personal Envoy of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the Western Sahara conflict, and Annan signs the proposals made by Baker. How does the Sahrawi diplomat feel about Mr Annan's indirect support to a Moroccan solution? 

- This is really what I never have been able to understand, unfortunately, with all the respect I have for him, Khadad answers with a disappointed look. "I don't understand the easiness in which he [Annan] gave the green light to the June 2001 report that included the Framework Agreement. I really cannot understand this change," he adds.

Khadad however reminds us again that the powers of Annan and Baker were limited, also within the UN system, something that was demonstrated as 10 of the 15 members of the Security Council voted against the Framework Agreement in April. "But unfortunately, the Secretary-General from time to time easily passively adopts or accepts the opinion of the dominant members [of the Security Council], which sometime is a very bad and unjust policy" he laments. 

He makes example of the case of the recent independence of East Timor - after 26 years of Indonesian occupation - to defend his statement. "How can you justify that one cannot apply the same policy in Western Sahara whereas Sahara started on the same process 7-8 years before Timor, and it is sufficient to state that there doesn't exist an Australia in the Maghreb to justify this. ... This is ridiculous!" 

The presence of the medium power Australia close to Timor to defend the new state's independence has been used as an argument to differentiate the Sahrawi and the Timorese conflicts. Khadad confirms that "they said this at the Security Council level, including Mr Baker: 'If there is no Australia...'" 

- So you feel that the UN is losing its credibility in the Western Sahara matter?

- Yes, of course! Khadad answers, even before the question is finished. "There is frustration and there is disappointment. The Sahrawis for over ten years have had blind confidence in the UN, they have accepted a cease fire, they have accepted to await a solution and they have made all kinds of concessions. But we know that the Sahrawis cannot accept what currently is happening. The UN is disqualifying itself; it's losing credibility in this matter. It's losing credibility." The usual smile on his lips has gone.

After reaching a cease fire in the Sahrawi conflict in 1991, the UN had been sticking to an agreement calling for a referendum of independence among the Sahrawis for ten years. Moroccan obstacles to the definition of voters' lists however had stalled the process and last year, Baker proposed the "Framework Agreement" amid Sahrawi objections. This year Baker and Annan presented four definite solutions to the Security Council: the Framework Agreement; giving the Minurso peacekeepers wider powers to organise the referendum; a partition of the territory; or - if nothing else works - a withdrawal of the UN peacekeepers. 

The Polisario so far only has said it totally rejects the Framework Agreement - as it would mean the inclusion of Western Sahara into Morocco - and demands the referendum to be implemented. We asked Khadad about Polisario's position regarding the other proposals. afrol News editor Rainer Hennig argued: "Even the referendum alternative would be an imposed solution, saying it would not require 'the concurrence of both parties before taking action.'"

- No, Khadad answered, explaining: "I think James Baker is asking the Security Council that more is implied - and more important - that it considers a solution based on non-consent of the parties that is non-negotiable." He elaborates: "The non-negotiable term is a call for the application of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that treats questions of peace and security. Until now, the Sahara matter has been treated under Chapter 6, which calls for the consent of the parties for every step taken. These are the basic rules of the peace plan, and [Baker] is asking the Security Council to consider the matter on the basis of Chapter 7." This was the new element of the proposals.

- But regarding this new element in the organisation of the referendum, would this not mean that Morocco would be disabled to present its more than 100,000 complaints to the voter's list? 

- Well, it may also be the other way round, Khadad holds. "It's all somewhat confusing." Polisario's position was however that one still must organise the referendum. The UN should indeed "consider all the 131,000 appeal made by Morocco," Khadad says. However, the most important was that "Baker is telling the Security Council that, following the same policy as during the last ten years, one cannot reach a solution to the conflict. It is necessary to change the course." 

- But in this aspect, Baker is right, or not? 

- Yes! It is necessary to change the course, Khadad emphasises. "One has to make the decision to impose this solution without needing the consent of the parties," he agrees. 

The Polisario thus agrees to the referendum alternative, even if the UN would impose an organisation of the referendum less favourable to the Sahrawis. The liberation movement has however not made any statements on the possible partition of the territory. 

- Speaking about a division of the territory, as I always have said, we will not accept a solution that does not enjoy the support of the Sahrawi people and its right to self-determination, Khadad answers. But it's not that black and white. "We have told Mr Baker that we in principle are not against negotiating - which does not mean accept, but negotiate - modifications or adjustments of the borders, having in mind some security and other considerations. But accepting already in advance a partition of the territory is something we reject." 

Morocco has strongly rejected a possible partition of the territory, and claims it is an Algerian proposal, made to enable Algeria getting access to the Atlantic coast through a satellite Sahrawi state. "Is it true that the proposal is of Algerian origin?" we ask Khadad. 

- What would I care where this proposal originates, Khadad says, shaking his head and emphasising that Algeria strongly support the Sahrawi people's struggle. 

- I would say that this proposal has been French, he however continues. "Why? Well, who started the partition of the territory in 1975 [when Morocco and Mauritania occupied one part each of ex-Spanish Sahara]? It was France convincing [Mauritanian] President Moktar Ould Dada to accept the Madrid Accord and the partition of the territory. Later, barely one year ago, French diplomats approached us to speak about such a solution and therefore I don't understand how it can be an exclusively Algerian idea." 

There remains the forth alternative - or ultimatum - of withdrawing the UN Minurso peacekeepers. We ask Khadad what this would imply. 

- We are not against a withdrawal of Minurso, he surprises us answering. "That is, if the aim of the UN presence in the territory is defending the reality of the Moroccan occupation and presence in the territory and lets foreign companies exploit the riches of the territory," he explains. "We will not complain over Minurso's withdrawal in the case that Minurso is not accomplishing its initial aim; that is to organise a referendum."

The withdrawal of Minurso would however most probably mean a return to warfare. One speaks of a large-scale Moroccan increase in its military capacities during the decade of the cease fire.

Khadad however does not see the relevance of an increase in Moroccan weaponry as this would not be "a classic conflict" where the numbers of armed forces and tanks count. Morocco undoubtedly has greater military forces but "what a liberation movement has, is the will and the determination of its combatants to gain freedom," he says. 

- Really, the desert wears down on the Sahrawis, who were born in the Sahara, but it wears even more down on the Moroccans, he continues. "All this time in the desert is not easy. A war is a war and nobody can predict who is able to win it or to lose it; it's not an automatic calculation. But I am not worried about a better preparation by the Moroccan army." 

- But what about the motivation within the Polisario? we ask. "After eleven years in Algerian refugee camps, moral cannot be high?" 

Khadad admits that these years "have their negative consequences on the troops' moral. But their mere existence is an expression of the refusal staying alive, not only in the refugee camps but also in the occupied zones," he adds.

Having heard Polisario's position regarding the four alternatives presented to the UN Security Council, it still remains unclear what the Council will decide. The Council already has adjourned the decision twice. "Will it come down on one of these solutions at all, having in mind that all include a risk of a return to war?" 

- Well three months ago, when the Council adopted its February resolution [not deciding on the alternatives], I thought the Council would have to choose between the four options, but after what happened in April [the second indecisive vote], I have more doubts, Khadad answers. 

He declares his disagreement with the process. "I think there is much discussion of the possibility of adopting only one option - as Mr Baker is asking for ... to be able to work in tranquillity with this option - or the possibility of presenting two or three options." 

Khadad explains the discussions going on in the Security Council. "There are some saying that one should understand the peace plan as a 'security network' and that one needs to treat two or three options at the same time. They say - and they are right - that too much time has been spent on the second option (the Framework Agreement) and that this already has been rejected clearly by the two parties to the conflict and the Security Council." 

- I think the Security Council has to decide on something: either opt for one of the options or decide it is not in the position to do anything, he concludes. "In that case, I wonder, who would take responsibility, in a situation where the Secretary-General was unable, where Baker was unable and where the Security Council now is throwing away the hot potato..." 

Tomorrow, in the forth and last part of the interview with Khadad, we ask the Sahrawi diplomat the more unpleasant questions about the Moroccan prisoners of war - some captive for over 20 years - which might be the one factor hindering Sahrawi President Abdelaziz from obtaining the Nobel Peace Prize he has been nominated to. We also ask Khadad whether one can trust Polisario's promises the Sahrawi Republic will be a democratic country, having the experiences of other liberation movements in mind.

By afrol editors Rainer Chr. Hennig and Pablo Gracia

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